An easy and popular method for measuring the size of the underground economy is to use macro-data such as money demand or electricity demand to infer what the legitimate economy needs, and then to attribute the remaining consumption to the underground economy. Such inferences rely on the stability of parameters of the demand equations, or at very least on knowledge of how these parameters are changing. We show that the pace of change of these parameters (such as velocity) is too variable in transition economies for the above methods of estimating the size of the underground economy to be applicable.
Introduction
In 2000 Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste published a major survey of how the underground economy is measured. Most of the essay gave itself over to analysing macro-methods for measuring the underground economy. A macro-method roots out the size of the underground economy from a functional form in which some observable macro variable depends on another observable macro variable and on the unobservable underground economy. The researcher infers the size of the underground economy by manipulating the functional form and plugging into the observable macro-variables information on their levels. For example, the "currency-ratio" method of estimating the underground economy holds that there is a stable ratio of currency in the legal economy to demand deposits and that this ratio enters into an equation relating the size of the underground economy to the size of the official economy. All one need know is the currency ratio in the official economy, then one plugs measured GDP into the abovementioned relation, and out pops the size of the underground economy. An undergraduate in a first year macroeconomics course could do the exercise in a few minutes. Schneider and Enste (2000) , as well as many other authors catalogued in a recent OECD (2002) handbook on measuring the underground economy are aware of the problems with this method of measuring the underground economy "on the cheap." The hunter of the underground economy must be confident that the functional relations he postulates between the dependent and independent variables are correct, and he has to believe that the parameter estimates with which he rounds out these equations (such as the ratio of currency to demand deposits) are accurate and stable. Without such assurance the researcher finds himself measuring with a yardstick that changes in unpredictable ways.
What neither Schneider and Enste, nor any other researchers we are aware of for that matter, do not emphasize is that the instability of parameters used in macro-methods may be of such size as to throw off estimates of transition underground economies to the point where such estimates are nearly useless both as indicators of the level of the underground economy, and, more seriously, useless as measures of the trend in the size of the underground economy.
Transition economies have many of the characteristics of a developed western economy, such as high education levels, and well-developed infrastructures, but these economies differ from developed western economies in that they have gone suddenly from stateplanning to a free market. Unlike underdeveloped economies, which might be quite stable, a transition economy's institutions are in a tumble. We shall review in detail two macro methods of estimating the underground sector---the money use and electricity consumption methods---and show that in a transition economy these methods are as reliable as compasses in a world where poles shift at the whim of some irritated god. In particular 1) Money use methods include the currency ratio method and currency demand method. Both are nearly useless for transition economies because of intensive financial innovation during transition. The number of financial products liable to affect currency demand grow at a much greater and more variable pace in transition economies than they do in mature western economies. One is tempted to infer from the huge growth in currency demand in the Czech and Slovak Republics in the 1990's that the underground economy was booming. We will show that growth in currency demand was related to factors that had nothing to do with the underground economy.
2) Using electricity consumption to measure the size of the underground economy is fraught with difficulties in transition economies where price deregulation, and the introduction of long-overdue technologies moves electricity demand in ways difficult to attribute to underground economy growth.
We shall illustrate the above two critiques of macro methods with data from varying transition countries, but principally with reference to the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic is an interesting case because it can be argued that it has largely finished its transition and so that the last twelve years of its economic history supply us with a completed experiment. We focus on the electricity and currency ratio methods because we have assembled detailed information on these sectors. Our plan is to lay bare the assumptions underlying the two methods and then to show why these assumptions have little value for transition economies. This paper does not pretend to be an exhaustive survey of the validity of all macro methods of measuring the underground economy in transition, but we believe the critiques we level at the electricity and currency ratio methods may be extended to other macro methods.
Electricity as a Measure of the Underground Economy
The electricity method of measuring the underground economy holds that the underground economy can be measured by using a single economic indicator, namely, electricity consumption. Daniel Kaufman and Aleksandr Kaliberda (1996) are prominent champions of this method, though as Schneider and Enste (2000) point out Lizerri was already using this method in 1979. To measure the size of the underground economy in the Ukraine and other FSU countries, Kaufman and Kaliberda began with the assumption (based on previous studies of the Soviet economy) that in 1989, most of these countries had an underground sector of 12% of GDP. They also assume that electricity consumption reacts with unit elasticity to economic growth. If an economy had GDP of $100 billion in 1989, then it had an underground economy worth $12 billion. If electricity consumption economy grew 10% in the next year this must mean the true economy grew by 10%. So the true economy's size would be $123.2 billion in 1990. One would then subtract government estimates of the official economy to get at underground economy size in 1990. To better see this consider Table 1 which is a reproduction of Table 3 in Kaufman and Kaliberda (1996) : GDP---1989 GDP--- -94 1989 GDP--- 1990 GDP--- 1991 GDP--- 1992 GDP--- 1993 GDP--- 1994 Growth rate in Electricity consumption 0.0% -2.2% -6.2% -7.8% -11.7%
Estimate growth rate in overall GDP 0.0% -2.2% -6.2% -7.8% -11.7%
Overall GDP index 100.0 100. by the overall index).
The ponderous nature of assuming a constant and identical elasticity for all the countries studies led Kaufman and Kaliberda to vary their assumptions about the unit elasticity relation between electricity and output by assuming two scenarios. The conservative scenario held that CEE countries had in the upswing of their economies a 0.9 elasticity, the Baltics had unit elasticity, and the rest of the FSU states had an elasticity of 1.15 in the upswing of their economies. In their overall conservative scenario Kaufman and Kaliberda assumed that except for the Baltics, every transition country studied managed every year to decrease energy consumption by 5% for every unit of good produced. The assumption of increasing efficiency was meant to account for a decreasing output of elasticity over time and so give the appearance that the authors have taken into account the dynamic context of energy consumption in transition economies.
is Maria Lacko's (1998 Lacko's ( , 2000 . Lacko also takes electric power consumption as a physical indicator of economic activity, but she focuses on household consumption of electricity, as she believes that household production is the major source of underground activity and that this activity is closely related to overall underground activity. She uses a two-stage regression technique (which we will describe later in the present paper) that relies on the assumption of a stable relationship between energy use and the underground economy in order to get an estimate of the underground economy's size.
In Table 2 we present Kaufman and Kaliberda's as well as Lacko's estimates of the underground economy for four similar transition economies. Table 6 Note: L 1998 and 2000 refers to the Lacko papers cited in references. We present estimates from Lacko's Table 5 based on a ten country analysis and her Table 6 based on a twenty country analysis. JKS 1997 are the Kaufman-Kaliberda(1996) estimates cited and expanded in the 1997 paper by Johnson, Kaufman, and Schleiffer (1997) .
The The unsettling features of these electricity methods can be summarized as follows:
• Different variants of the method produce significantly different quantitative results for individual estimates.
• For an individual country the time trend of the estimated size of the informal economy differs for different methods used (see the Czech Republic).
• Comparing the rankings of countries produced by different methods we find that the qualitative results of different methods also vary significantly.
Even if there were no sign of contradictions in electricity measures of the underground economy we believe this method's assumptions are unrealistic for transition economies.
An objectionable feature of some electricity methods is that they postulate a either a one-to-one relation between electricity consumption and GDP, or a stable relationship between electricity consumption and GDP, or in more sophisticated applications of these methods, such as Kaufman Kaliberda (1996) , the assumption of that there is a steady rise in the efficient use of electricity so that the output elasticity of electricity consumption is decreasing at a constant rate.
The one-to-one or constant relationship between electricity use and GDP is a stylizedfact gleaned from developed economies where there is a stable sectoral composition of GDP. Each sector has its specific electricity demand for every $1 of GDP the sector produces. Developed economies have not known the sort of price fluctuation and massive restructuring of energy-use technologies that economies in transition have known.
In spite of Kaufman and Kaliberda's optimism in their assumptions, a glance at some easily available macro-data from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia makes evident that the electricity method's assumption of a stable relationship between GDP and electricity use does not apply to transition economies. Table 3 below shows that in transition each of the named economies' total, and primary sector energy use fell radically and in irregular leaps during the 1990's whereas measures for the EU, the OECD, and the US show almost no change in these energy uses. Energy use fell in the transition countries listed in Table 3 because these countries decided to move away from their communist heritage of heavy industrial production.
For example, between 1990 and 1997 iron and steel production in the Czech Republic fell from 21 million tones to six million tones. The drop in industrial production in turn lowered demand for railway transport, which was heavily dependent on electricity. For example, in the Czech Republic in 1990 railways transported 170 billion tones of goods whereas trucks carried 173 billion tones. In 2001 railways were carrying only 97 billion tones whereas trucks were carrying 440 billion tones.
numbers pose for the Kaufmann-Kaliberda method is that in such a shifting environment it is hard to pretend that there is a stable one-to-one relationship between GDP and electricity use or at least that there was a constant change in this relationship.
Instead one must recognize that there was a highly variable reduction in the share of total electricity consumption going to the primary sector.
12 for reasons that have nothing to do with output changes. Kaufman and Kaliberda (1996) recognize the problem and explain that these reasons for electricity consumption change fall into two negatively correlated categories that offset each other in biasing estimates of the underground economy. In the category of downward bias consider that if an economy is changing its output-mix by moving from the primary to the secondary sector, electricity consumption will decline with no overall change in output. One might then wrongly infer the underground economy has shrunk. We might be led into a similar bias if electricity prices are increasing relative to other energy prices, and if industry is becoming more efficient at using electricity. Factors that could bias our estimates of the underground economy upward are the substitution of electricity for other sources, such as natural gas, and higher overhead and fixed electricity use during an economic downswing. A glance at each of the listed items shows that they could belong to either category. If electricity prices are falling then this factor should be taken out of the downward bias category and put into the upward bias category. If the output mix is shifting more towards the primary sector then it too should be placed into the upward bias category. One can play this logic game to show that all factors listed above might, under the right circumstances, be lumped into just one category. In such a case there would be no negative correlation between categories upon which Kaufman and Kaliberda could base their hope of producing estimates of the underground economy that are unbiased. in electricity use can show why the Kaufman-Kaliberda will likely produced biased estimates of the underground economy. Table 4 shows that in the Czech Republic, sometimes the price of electricity relative to natural gas and other sources rose and sometimes it fell. No stable patter can be gleaned. The unstable pattern in prices combined with changes in household production technologies to change demand for electricity in patterns that would have been hard to predict. During the early 1990's, citizens of the Czech Republic massively converted from heating with domestic coal ovens to heating with gas and electricity. Czechs also began to invest heavily in durables such as refrigerators, washing machines, dishwashers, televisions, and home computers. These upgrades to domestic life may account for the part of the rise in household consumption of electricity during transition period. The steep rise in electricity prices in 1997 may account for the downward trend in electricity consumption later on. So in the early years electricity prices would have belonged to the upward bias category and in later years to the downward bias category. Now consider industry. During transition Czech industry was rapidly finding new ways of reducing its energy consumption by adopting innovative production techniques. Table 5 shows that even though Czech electricity output was increasing, noxious emissions dove. The noxious emissions noted above come from electricity generation and industrial production. Part of the dive in pollution came from the Czech parliament's adoption of EU environmental regulations far ahead of the prescribed deadlines. It might be argued that environmental compliance leads to less efficient methods of producing electricity, but this ignores that in the period above the Czech Republic transformed itself into a net exporter of electricity. Industry was producing more output with less electricity.
Increases in energy efficiency were continuous and would have biased underground economy calculations downward. When we combine this observation with the observation on household electricity demand we get both effects negating each other at first and adding to each other later. The point is that we cannot blithely assuming changing output mixes of different sectors will cancel the bias with which each threatens estimates of the underground economy.
Maria Lacko (2000) also finds a failure to account for changing industry output-mix to be a major problem with the Kaufman-Kaliberda method and has championed her household electricity approach which "avoids the problem of the inherited structure of the economies [sic] and its rapid adjustment in the transition period." Although the sentence is cryptic, we interpret her to mean that industries in transition economies had to change their energy use because with the disappearance of socialist emphasis on heavy industry transition economies had to rapidly change the types of goods they produced. Lacko believes households faced no such a change in their domestic production output mix. As changes in domestic production output mix would be difficult to control for, the absence of change in household output mix need not be controlled for in an econometric model which seeks to estimate the underground economy in the following manner: Lacko examines a times-series of cross sections of transition countries and postulates a regression between the size of the underground economy (which she calls H) and independent variables such as tax rates, and level of government spending. She also postulates a regression in which the size of the underground economy is an independent variable in a regression explaining household electricity consumption. Readers must be cautious in reading Lacko's presentation of this, her equation (1) because the equation includes the real price of consumption of 1 kWh of residential electricity, but later we learn that "The price variable PR ij was not included in the estimated function, mainly due to lack of data."
Her trick for getting estimates of H is to substitute the right hand side of the H regression, which consists of measurable variables and parameters that can be estimated as proxies for H in the right hand side of the electricity regression. She then estimates the electricity regression and attributes that part of the dependent variable explained by her substitution from the H equation as being the size of the underground economy.
Quite apart from the question of whether she has correctly formulated the H equation, her estimates rely on the assumption of stable regression estimates, that is, she is assuming that the manner in which people use electricity does not change. Our critique of the Kaufman Kaliberda (1996) method was based on the overwhelming prevalence of such changes. She hopes to avoid the critique of unstable regression parameters by asserting that household output mix is constant during transition. Even if such were the case, the way in which households produced domestic goods changed radically throughout the 1990's, as our discussion of Table 4 emphasized. If household production methods are rapidly changing the parameters of the household demand for electricity equation must also be changing rapidly. Presumably such a change could be controlled for with a time trend variable, but if the rate of technology change forces the use of a time-trend longer than the time-series available on household electricity use, regression parameters of the electricity use equation may suffer from bias. Lacko includes in her household electricity use equations the ratio of energy sources other than electricity energy to all energy sources in household energy consumption in order to control for household substitution between various energy sources; if one uses more gas, one will use less electricity. Inclusion of this variable seems to us to simply be like including part of an identity in a regression. Even if we were to accept this control we would emphasize as before that it does not provide a sufficient number of data points to explain changes in all regression coefficients in the household electricity use equation.
We have not discussed in detail the recent study by Eilat and Zinnes (2000) which accounts for industry output mix in an electricity use equation to arrive at an estimate of the size of the underground economy which they believe to be superior to that of Kaufman and Kaliberda and Lacko. Are main remark on the Eilat-Zinnes piece is that it also suffers from the problem that including an industry output-mix variable as a control in an electricity use equation does nothing to account for how price elasticity of demand may vary in response to changing production technology. How this price-elasticity of demand changes will be reflected in the coefficient of the price variable in the electricity use equation and researchers in a transition economy simply do not have a sufficient number of data points to estimate changing regression coefficients.
In summary, because of the shifting reasons for electricity demand none of the electricity methods we have described above holds much promise for giving us an idea of the size of the underground economy, and more seriously of giving us an idea of how this economy is changing. As we shall see in the next section, similar critiques cripple monetary approaches to measuring the underground economy in transition economies.
Monetary approach -Currency Ratio and Currency Demand Methods
As mentioned earlier, researchers have applied the currency ratio and money demand methods to measure the size of the informal sector. Almost all these studies however focus either on developing countries or on developed countries. We are aware of only two studies ( Perhaps researchers are aware of the weakness of currency methods, or perhaps they have not got around to applying this method to transition economies. Whatever their reasons, we believe such an effort would be as misplaced as are efforts to measure the size of the underground economy by electricity methods. To understand our misgivings about currency methods we must first have a look at how they work.
The currency ratio method, whose current popularity can be dated back to Gutmann estimate of k O one has to assume that in some initial period the size of informal economy is zero, and therefore that observed total currency equals currency in official sector. Such an assumption allows us to calculate k O in the initial period. We then assume that this ratio is constant for the years that follow.
Guttman's currency ratio-method has a close ally in Tanzi's (1983) currency-demand method. The essence of this method is to estimate a money demand equation using conventional variables and to include variables that would be related to the underground economy, such as the level of taxes and the complexity of the tax system. One then calculates the percentage of variation in money demand explained by these nonconventional variables in order to get at how much money is being used by the underground economy---a technique very similar in spirit to the one Lacko (2000) uses in her electricity method. To get at the size of the underground economy one then multiplies this underground money demand by the velocity of money. Here the key assumptions are of a constant velocity of money and of proper specification of the money demand equation.
Both currency methods described above have problems that parallel electricity methods.
The assumption of a base year when the size of the underground economy was known, combined with the assumption of the constancy of some parameter seem like deja vue from the researches of Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) and Lacko (2000) .
Is there a base year for any transition economies, in which we have data on currency and demand deposits in an economy without an informal sector? The answer is an unequivocal "no." Researchers are frank about this limitation of the currency ratio method and see it as a major obstacle to measuring the level of the informal sector.
Problems of estimating the informal sector using money-methods are compounded when we consider that the currency-demand deposit ratio and velocity are bound to be very unstable for transition economies. Instability in money demand is due to catch-up effects in the banking sector of transition economies. Many previously non-existent financial services and products find their way to market in a brief time. The pace of financial innovation may be much higher (though the level is no more advanced) than in developed economies. Financial innovation can destabilize money demand as these forces buffet the motives for holding cash. To see this more clearly, consider the following. In the pre-transition period a handful of state-owned savings and loans type banks made up the banking sector. Due to a lack of competition the scope of banking services was very limited. Following transition foreign banks entered financial markets and introduced competition. Competition narrows the gap between the level of financial services provided in transition and developed economies. Obviously, some products such as cheques were never introduced in transition countries, as they were already outdated and superceded by credit and debit cards.
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Money demand in transition countries can also change for the following reasons: 1) A lack of credit is a feature of early transition economies and forces people to hold cash. As credit widens (see Table 7 showing the growth in credit cards), cash holdings fall. There is also a commercial side to the instability in money demand. Bank failures during transition can force agents to change their cashholding strategies towards holding increasing amounts of cash. At the same time transition economies experience great ups and downs in taxes. These taxes will in turn move people either to transact in cash to avoid their obligations to government. 3) Artis and Lewis (1974) argue that in the UK in 1974, due to the changes in the banking regulations brought about by the Competition and Credit Control Act, the currency to demand deposit ratio changed in ways that are hard to measure.
The same must be true of transition countries where regulations were in a greater flux than they were in the UK. Many transition countries changed their regulations quite frequently, slowly introducing deposit insurance (with changed upper limits for the amount insured). A prominent example is the change in the minimum reserve requirements in the Czech Republic as Table 8 shows: 4) Almost all transition countries succumbed to banking crises in the 1990's. The loss and return of depositor confidence was bound to at first raise, and then depress the currency to demand deposit ratio in ways that are hard to measure.
We can state that during two years (starting in the second half of 1995, ending in 1997) Czech banks saw an exodus of deposits, which can be attributed to a lack of trust in banks, after several bank failures. After several central bank interventions, the credit of banks was restored, and withdrawn money appeared in deposits again (giving an enormous rise in annual savings ratios in 1997 or early 1998).
To get a feeling for the volatility of currency to demand deposit ratios, consider Figure 1 and 120% 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Czech R.
Slovakia Hungary Poland Canada France Table 9 : Currency to demand deposits ratio (in percentage points) 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Conclusion
Measuring the underground economy is one of the last great frontiers of economics. This is not a bold statement, but rather, a lament. Nearly a thousand years ago the Norman conquerors of England did away with the Danegeld and replaced it with a tax based on the Domesday book. The "book" was a catalogue of the tax base of England.
The Domesday book is, in the minds of the authors of the present work, one of the reasons for which England grew to be a powerful and just nation. A proper measurement of the tax base allows governments to distribute evenly and efficiently the 26 burden for financing public projects. Economies in transition have no Norman conquerors that would insist on establishing an efficient system of taxation. There can be no will to spread taxes evenly if there is no reliable measure of who pays taxes and who evades these taxes.
"Macro" measures of tax evasion suffer two flaws. They do not finger who it is that evades, and they do not provide a consistent and reasonable estimate of the magnitude of evasion, more seriously, of how that economy is changing. Economists understand that everything has a price and that talk is cheap. Macro estimates of the underground economy are cheap-talk. An undergraduate student wishing to finish his term paper on tax evasion can, using macro techniques, trot out estimates of the underground economy with a few keystrokes on his computer. We hope to have shown that macro estimates of the underground economy rely on assumptions that are questionable for mature economies and unrealistic for transition economies.
Our critique is not original. Practitioners of macro-methods for estimating the underground economy understand that their estimates rely on the realism of their model and on the constancy of their assumptions about key parameters in their model. We have shown that assumptions about the size and stability of key parameters in macro models, such as the velocity of money and the structure of electricity demand, are doubtful for mature economies and metaphysical for transition economies. Measuring the size underground economy in transition economies may be an impossible task, but measuring how it changes may be feasible by using panel studies that yearly ask people about what they believe is the size of the underground economy and whether or not they in engage in underground economic activities.
